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INTRODUCTION
Environmental law is a vast and complicated subject which
has undergone significant growth and change in recent years.
One important aspect of this change has been increasing in-
volvement of private citizens, both as individuals and as organ-
ized groups,' in the development and enforcement of
t Mr. Nauen is a partner in the Minneapolis law firm of Opperman & Paquin,
practicing in the areas of commercial and class action litigation. Mr. Nauen has liti-
gated several citizen environmental lawsuits in Minnesota and Wisconsin on behalf of
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. and Citizens for a Better Environment. Wil-
liam L. Roberts, a second-year law student, provided research assistance for this
article.
1. A few of the groups most active in citizen lawsuits are Friends of the Earth,
the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, The Sierra Club,
and Citizens for a Better Environment. Raymond Proffitt has been one of the indi-
viduals active in pursuing citizen enforcement suits. See Proffitt v. Commissioners,
Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985); Proffitt v. Lower Bucks County
Joint Mun. Auth., No. 86-7220 (E.D. P. May 12, 1988).
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environmental laws. The increase in citizen environmental
lawsuits is one manifestation of this development.
Originating in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,2 citi-
zen suit provisions can now be found in a wide array of envi-
ronmental laws.3 The most significant of those laws are the
Clean Air Act 4 (CAA), the Clean Water Act5 (CWA), the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act 6 (RCRA), and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act 7 (CERCLA). Among these, the Clean Water Act
has seen by far the most citizen lawsuits in recent years. 8
This article is designed to serve two main purposes. First, it
will give the reader an introduction to the fundamentals in liti-
gating a citizen lawsuit, including the major legal issues and
major practical problems. This discussion will take place
predominantly in the context of the Clean Water Act, although
the unique features of each of the above acts will be discussed.
Second, this article will discuss the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation.9 Gwaltney answered some questions about citi-
zen environmental lawsuits but left other questions open and,
in some cases, increased confusion about central issues in such
lawsuits. This article will discuss the situation leading up to
Gwaltney, the Gwaltney holding, and issues left open or confused
by the Gwaltney decision.
I. CITIZEN LAWSUIT BACKGROUND
The grandparent of all environmental citizen lawsuits is Sec-
2. See 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5356.
3. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (1982); Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1982); Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982); Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1982); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33
U.S.C. § 1515 (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (1982); Noise
Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (a) (1982); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1982).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6986 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9659 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
8. See L. Jorgenson &J. Kimmell, Environmental Citizen Suits: Confronting the Corpo-
ration, Special Report (BNA) at 19 and appendices (1988) (reporting that of the 1,209
citizen actions reviewed, 882 contained claims under the CWA, 265 contained claims
under RCRA, and 71 contained claims under CERCLA).
9. 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
[Vol. 15
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tion 304 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.10 Frus-
trated by the failure of earlier efforts to achieve the goals of the
CAA, I t Congress implemented a unique enforcement mecha-
nism-citizen lawsuits. Section 304 authorized "any person"' 12
to commence a civil action against certain parties, including
the United States Government and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), for the purpose of achieving enforcement
of the emission standards and limitations established pursuant
to the CAA.
Defining the proper role of citizen lawsuits in the CAA
scheme 13 has been a difficult process. The Senate Committee
responsible for the provision 14 stated:
Government initiative in seeking enforcement of the Clean
Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing the citizens to
bring suits for violation of standards should motivate gov-
ernmental agencies charged with responsibility to bring en-
forcement and abatement proceedings.' 5
Thus, an important objective of citizen lawsuits was to en-
courage enforcement of the CAA by government agencies.
That is not to say, however, that citizen lawsuits are not de-
sirable as an alternative enforcement mechanism. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has declared
that those pursuing citizen lawsuits "are not to be treated as
nuisances or troublemakers but rather as welcome participants
in the vindication of environmental interests."' 16 Further, the
10. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
11. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982).
13. The structure and operation of the CAA is a fascinating topic in itself. For
purposes of this article, a brief description will suffice. While remaining faithful to
the proposition that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the
primary responsibility of States and local governments," 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (a)(3), the
1970 amendments to the CAA called for much greater control by the federal govern-
ment in the anti-pollution effort. The EPA was instructed to establish primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7409. Each state
was obligated, in accordance with a timetable, to promulgate a plan for implementing
these standards; each state's plan is subject to review and approval by the EPA. 42
U.S.C. § 7410 (1982). Once a state's plan is approved by the EPA, the state is re-
quired to carry it out. Id.
14. The House version of the bill included no citizen suit provision. See Carey,
535 F.2d at 172 n.12 (citing Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1783, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)).
15. SENATE CoMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess.
35-36 (1970), quoted in Carey, 535 F.2d at 172.
16. Carey, 535 F.2d at 172.
19891
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intent of Congress to encourage citizen lawsuits is shown in
the explicit relaxation of common jurisdictional barriers and in
the provision allowing recovery of attorney's fees.
17
Congress did not go as far as it might have, however, in en-
couraging citizen suits under the CAA. Section 304 did not
allow recovery of damages for emission standard violations,
nor did it grant power to the federal district courts to assess
civil penalties against violators.' 8 The best remedy for which a
plaintiff can hope under section 304 is an injunction against a
defendant to perform the act demanded by plaintiff. 19 This
cautious approach to citizen lawsuits reflects Congress' balanc-
ing of its desire for goading and supplementing EPA enforce-
ment against the dangers of interference of EPA enforcement
and abuse and overload of the courts through a flood of citizen
lawsuits. 20
The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act2 1 was
modeled after section 304 of the CAA. 22 Accordingly, its
structure and operation are quite similar to that of the CAA.
23
Section 505 of the CWA authorizes a citizen lawsuit (1) against
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982) provides for jurisdiction "without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties." Section 7604(d) authorizes
the courts to award reasonable attorney's fees. Id.
18. The courts have consistently refused to read § 7604 as authorizing civil pen-
alties. See, e.g., State v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 490 F. Supp. 1145, 1151 (N.D. Ill.
1980); State v. Long Island Lighting Co., 535 F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 1982);
Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1160 n.l (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040,
1047 (D. Del. 1973), aff'd. 510 F.2d 969 (1975).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982) ("The district court shall have jurisdiction...
to enforce such an emission standard . . . or to order the Administrator to perform
such act or duty .. ")
20. See Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 546 F. Supp. 1357, 1361
(D.D.C. 1982) ("Congress made 'particular efforts to draft a provision that would not
reduce the effectiveness of administrative enforcement, . . . nor cause abuse of the
courts while at the same time still preserving the right of citizens to such enforcement
of the act.' ") (quoting 116 CONG. REC. § 3375 (daily ed. March 10, 1980) (remarks of
Sen. Cooper)), reprinted in I ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
at 387 (1974).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
22. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 383 (1987)
(citing S.REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 79 (1971)), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 93RD CONG., IST SESS., 2 A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at
1497 (1973).
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"any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of 4 (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an or-
der issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such
a standard or limitation. . -25or (2) the Administrator of the
EPA "where there is alleged a failure to perform a non-discre-
tionary duty under the CWA. '"
26
This article is concerned primarily with actions against al-
leged violators and not those against the EPA. 27 Each of these
citizen suit provisions places two significant limitations on a
plaintiff's ability to bring suit. The first of these is the notice
provision. 28 Each of the provisions requires that a plaintiff
give notice to the EPA, the state, and the alleged violator
before an action is commenced. 29 Second, no private action
may be commenced if the EPA or a state has commenced and
is "diligently prosecuting" a civil action in a federal or state
court.
30
Because all of these environmental citizen suit provisions are
similar in structure and contain much identical language, pre-
cedent under one statute is often useful for issues involving
another.3 Similarly, courts often rely on the legislative history
of the CAA in construing the citizen suit provision of the
24. The CAA, RCRA, and CERCLA provisions contain this identical language.
This language was crucial to the Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney, as discussed
later in this article. It is likely, therefore, that the Gwaltney opinion will apply with
equal force to citizen lawsuits under all four of these provisions.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982). The CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (1982), pro-
vides for an action against "any person who proposes to construct or constructs any
new or modified major emitting facility without a permit... or who is alleged to be in
violation of any condition of such permit." In 1984, the citizen suit provision of
RCRA was amended, adding a new basis for citizen lawsuits, namely, actions to abate
an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
27. For a discussion of causes of actions against the EPA see Timbers & Wirth,
Private Rights of Action and Judicial Review in Federal Environmental Law, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 403 (1985).
28. See infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
29. There are certain exceptions to this provision. For example, actions respect-
ing hazardous waste management under RCRA may be brought immediately after
notice is given. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). See also infra note 48 and
accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 62-81 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzsche,
Dodge and Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1135-37 and 1136 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1985) (court
uses cases involving citizen suits under Clean Air Act to interpret the citizen suit
provision of the CWA).
1989]
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CWA.32
The most significant difference between the CAA and subse-
quent environmental citizen suit provisions is the availability of
civil penalties under the latter acts. The citizen lawsuit provi-
sion under the CAA is restricted to the remedy of injunction.
Nowhere in the provision are civil penalties mentioned, and
courts have refused to assess civil penalties under section
304.33 In contrast, civil penalties are available under the CWA,
RCRA, and CERCLA.34
II. FUNDAMENTALS OF A CWA CITIZEN SUIT
(33 U.S.C. § 1365)
A. Standing to Sue
Essential to the litigation of any citizen lawsuit is an under-
standing of the legal issues commonly encountered in such
suits. The first issue of critical importance in any lawsuit is
standing to sue. Generally, in the environmental context
standing takes on a central role, and this is certainly true in
citizen environmental lawsuits.
Section 505(a) of the Act provides that "any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf . . ."35 Section
505(g) defines "citizen" as "a person or persons having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected." 36
In Sierra Club v. SCM Corp. ,37 this language was interpreted to
confer standing on those who meet the requirements enunci-
ated in the seminal Supreme Court case of Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton.3 8 The Supreme Court in Morton held that, to establish
standing to sue, a party must show more than a "mere interest
in a problem."3 9 Rather, to meet the constitutional require-
ment, a party must allege an "injury in fact." In other words,
32. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assoc.,
453 U.S. 1, 17 n.27 (1981); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. V. Train, 510
F.2d 692, 699-702 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c) (Supp. IV 1986) (granting district courts the power to
impose civil penalties under CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (providing for civil penalties under RCRA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (civil
penalties available under CWA).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982).
37. 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984).
38. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
39. Id. at 739.
[Vol. 15
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"the party seeking review be himself among the injured."40
The Court readily acknowledged, however, that injury to an
aesthetic and environmental interest is sufficient to constitute
"injury in fact. "
4
1
The upshot of Morton, as applied in SCM Corp., is that envi-
ronmental groups, to establish standing, must allege injury in
fact to an individual member of the group due to defendant's
violations. This is often done by means of affidavits signed by
group members who live near or frequently use the polluted
area, or whose enjoyment of points downstream from the pol-
lution is affected by the pollution.42
B. Notice
Section 505(b)(1) of the Act provides that no action may be
commenced against a person alleged to be in violation of a
standard or limitation under the Act "prior to sixty days after
the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the
Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation
occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limita-
tion or order." 43
Pursuant to section 505(b), the EPA has established regula-
tions regarding the proper procedures for notification. 44
These regulations detail both the manner in which notice
40. Id. at 735.
41. Id. at 734.
42. See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al-Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F.
Supp. 284 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (interference with enjoyment downstream when polluted
body flows into non-polluted body is sufficient to establish standing even when per-
sons bringing suit do not use polluted body of water itself).
The other elements necessary to establish constitutional standing, that the injury
be fairly traceable to the challenged action and likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision, have not been significant obstacles for citizen-plaintiffs in this type of ac-
tion. In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440 (D.
Md. 1985), the court held that plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that the injury
is directly traceable to specific discharges by the defendant. Id. at 446. The court
reasoned that to require such a particularized showing would "virtually emasculate
the citizen's suit provision by making it impossible for any plaintiff to demonstrate
standing." Id. at 446.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (1982). 60-day notice is required for an action against
the Administrator as well. See § 505(b)(2).
The statute provides for one exception. Actions respecting violations of §§ 1316
and 1317(a) of Title 33 may be brought immediately after notification. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(2) (1982).
44. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 135.1-135.3 (1987) (Notice regulations for CWA). See also,
40 C.F.R. §§ 254.1-254.3 (1987) (notice regulations for RCRA).
1989]
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should be accomplished and the precise contents of the
notice.4
5
Despite the clear statutory language and the simple proce-
dures for giving notice, the issue of adequate notice is often
litigated. Currently, the courts are divided on the strictness
with which this notice provision is to be interpreted and ap-
plied. 46 Many courts, including the Ninth Circuit,47 the First
Circuit,48 the Sixth Circuit,49 and the Seventh Circuit50 con-
sider the notice requirement a jurisdictional prerequisite.
Hence, if the provision is not strictly complied with, the court
will dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The arguments in support of this conclusion center around the
plain language of the statute, construed in light of the legisla-
tive history and the statutory scheme. The Act clearly states
that "[n]o action may be commenced ...prior to sixty days
after plaintiff has given notice. . . ,,51 This language, coupled
with the single explicit exception to the notice requirement,52
strongly indicates a congressional intent to preclude actions
commenced without proper notice.53 Further, the legislative
history indicates that the sixty-day notice period was intended
45. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3 (1987) provides:
Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent standard or limitation or
of an order with respect thereto, shall include sufficient information to per-
mit the recipient to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order al-
leged to have been violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the
person or persons responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the
alleged violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name, ad-
dress, and telephone number of the person giving notice.
Id.
46. See Note, How the Lorax Can Save the Truffula Trees: The Environmental Remedies
Available to the Individual, 51 Mo. L. REV. 1013, 1026 (1986).
47. Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 831 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1987) (adopting
"jurisdictional prerequisite" approach).
48. Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 1985) (adopting strict
approach).
49. Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 316-17 (6th Cir. 1985) (com-
pliance with notice requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a citizen
suit under both CWA and RCRA).
50. City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976) (holding that, where plaintiff gave no notice to EPA, fact
that EPA had 60 days to respond under the Federal Rules did not excuse lack of
notice).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(A) (1982).
52. Section 1365(b) provides that an action may be brought immediately if sec-
tions 1316 or 1317(a) are alleged to be in violation.
53. See, e.g., Walls, 761 F.2d at 317 ("prior notice was viewed by Congress as cru-
cial in defining the proper role of the citizen suit").
[Vol. 15
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to assure that the EPA had sufficient opportunity to act upon
the alleged violation, thereby rendering a citizen lawsuit un-
necessary. 54 Failing to enforce this notice requirement would
thwart this intent and reduce significantly the EPA's ability to
control enforcement of the Act.
Other courts, including the Third Circuit 55 and the Second
Circuit,56 have adopted a less strict approach. These courts
have refused to allow form to triumph over substance and rec-
ognize in the context of Section 505(b) the doctrines of sub-
stantial compliance and notice-in-fact. Thus, in Susquehanna
Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor,57 the court
held that since the defendants and the EPA had actual notice of
the alleged violations more than sixty days before the suit was
filed, the notice requirement of the Act had been met even
though plaintiff filed suit only two days after sending a notice
letter.58 Similarly, in National Resource Defense Council v. Cal-
laway,59 the court held that the plaintiff's filing suit only fifty
days after notice was given did not deprive the court of juris-
diction where the EPA had already informed the plaintiff that
no action would be taken.
60
Defendants have also attacked the substantive sufficiency of
the plaintiff's notice letter. Thus far, the courts have been un-
willing to dismiss a plaintiff's action simply because notice was
substantively deficient. The courts have held that as long as
minimal information is provided, substantial compliance will
suffice, even when the EPA regulations have not been precisely
followed. 61
54. Id.
55. Proffitt v. Commissioners, Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir.
1985) (sixty-day notice requirement should be "applied flexibly to avoid hinderance
of citizen suits through excessive formalism"); Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for a
Hygienic Environment v. Eaton, 644 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1981).
56. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir.
1975).
57. 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980).
58. 619 F.2d at 243. See also Kitlutsisti v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 832,
841-42 (D. Alaska 1984) (holding that plaintiff's notice to defendant in an action in
1982 constituted substantial compliance with § 505(b) for a related action com-
menced in 1984).
59. 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975).
60. Id. at 83-84.
61. See, e.g., Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1536 (D.C.
Pa. 1985) (notice setting forth location of violations, the names of the people seeking
compensation, and the alleged violations held sufficient even though neither the par-
ticular dates of the violations nor the activity constituting the alleged violations was
1989]
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Obviously, a plaintiff should follow the letter of the law in
both the timing and substance of notice. The courts do indeed
take the notice provision of section 505(b) seriously; unex-
cused failure to comply will almost certainly lead to dismissal.
Nevertheless, some courts have shown a willingness to over-
look technical deficiencies in a plaintiff's notice where the un-
derlying purposes of the notice provision has been served.
C. Lack of Diligent Prosecution
The second statutory barrier to bringing a citizen lawsuit can
be found at section 505(b)(1)(B) of the Act. This clause pro-
vides that "[n]o action may be commenced ... if the Adminis-
trator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a
State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or
order, but in any such action in a court of the United States,
any citizen may intervene as a matter of right."
62
The key interpretative questions under this language are:
(1) what is a court; (2) what is diligent prosecution; and
(3) when must the action be commenced? In Baughman v. Brad-
ford Coal Company, the Third Circuit addressed the first issue.
63
In Baughman, the court discussed the question of whether an
administrative board64 may be a "court" within the meaning of
the statute.65 The Baughman court held that, in this case, the
administrative board was not a "court" under the statute.
66
The court conceded, however, that an administrative board or
proceeding may constitute a "court," where such tribunal has
"the power to accord relief which is the substantial equivalent
to that available to the EPA in federal courts," including the
power to enjoin and to assess meaningful penalties, and where
set forth); National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Company, 657 F. Supp.
989, 998 (W.D. Mich. 1987) rev'd on other grounds 862 F.2d 580 (1988) (substance of
plaintiff's notice held sufficient although plaintiff "could have been more specific");
Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (plaintiffs' actual notice
served the purpose of the notice requirement).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982).
63. 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979). Baughman involved an action under the Clean
Air Act, which contains an equivalent "diligent prosecution" provision. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(b)(l)(B) (1982).
64. In this case the administrative board involved was the Pennsylvania Environ-
mental Hearing Board. Id. at 217.
65. Id. at 217-18.
66. Id. at 218.
[Vol. 15
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the tribunal had procedures comparable to those in federal
court.
6 7
The Second Circuit has refused to adopt the Third Circuit's
expansive construction of this clause. In Friends of the Earth v.
Consolidated Rail Corporation,68 the court stated that since the
Act unambiguously refers to an action in a "court of the
United States, or a State, . . . [i]t would be inappropriate to
expand this language to include administrative enforcement
actions. " 69 This clear-cut refusal to include administrative
proceedings within the meaning also was followed by the Ninth
Circuit in Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
70
One interesting and, to this point, unresolved issue on the
preclusive effect of administrative actions is whether an admin-
istrative penalties action under section 309(g) 7' bars a citizen
lawsuit under the Act.
A second issue under the diligent prosecution clause is
whether the Administrator or state is, in fact, "diligently prose-
cuting"72 its case against the alleged violator. Naturally, reso-
lution of this issue depends upon the facts of a particular case.
In general, the courts have been willing to examine the details
of the state enforcement proceedings to see if their efforts have
been diligent. Where the state has achieved a Consent Order
73
but has failed to enforce the order, such action does not reach
the level of diligent prosecution. 74 One court has held that the
diligence of the state's prosecution must be presumed "absent
persuasive evidence that the state has engaged in a pattern of
conduct in its prosecution of the defendant that could be con-
67. Baughman, 592 F.2d at 219. This approach has been followed by the Third
Circuit (itself) in Student Public Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge and
Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985). This analysis was also followed in
Wiconisco Creek Watershed v. Kocher Coal Co., 641 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
68. 768 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1985) (dealing with a citizen suit brought under the
CWA).
69. Id. at 62.
70. 834 F.2d 1517, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987).
71. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(g) (West Supp. 1988).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (1982).
73. A Consent Order or Consent Decree is a negotiated settlement between the
parties submitted to and approved by the court.
74. See Love v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832,
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sidered dilatory, collusive or otherwise in bad faith." 75
The answer to the third interpretative question under the
diligent prosecution clause (when must the action be com-
menced in order to bar a citizen suit?) appears to be well-set-
tled. An action by the Administrator or state must have been
commenced prior to the filing of the citizen suit in order to bar
that citizen suit.76 The courts have felt compelled to reach this
conclusion by the unambiguous language of section
505(b)(1)(B). The statute states, "[n]o action may be commenced
... if the . . .State has commenced" 77 an action. Clearly, this
language contemplates only state actions commenced prior to
the filing of a citizen suit. Defendants have argued that the
purpose underlying the diligent prosecution clause, that a de-
fendant not be subjected simultaneously to multiple suits and
potentially conflicting court orders regarding the same statu-
tory standards, 78 is equally served whether the state action was
filed before or after the citizen suit. 79 Thus far, however, the
courts have not been persuaded by this argument, reasoning
that the trial court may consolidate the cases or allow the citi-
zen or Administrator to intervene in order to manage the
court's docket and protect defendants from duplicative
litigation.8 0
D. Statute of Limitations
The CWA contains no statute of limitations.8 ' Thus, a court
is left with three alternatives in determining the proper time
limitation for a citizen lawsuit. First, it might conclude that no
statute of limitations applies. Second, it could apply an analo-
gous state statute of limitations. Finally, a court could apply
75. Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F. Supp. 1291,
1293 (D. Conn. 1986).
76. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. American Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 208-09
(4th Cir. 1985); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Koch Ref. Co., 681 F. Supp 609,
614 (D. Minn. 1988); Connecticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 660 F.
Supp. 1397, 1403-04 (D. Conn. 1987); Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating
Co., 623 F. Supp. 207, 215 (D. Conn. 1985).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1982) (emphasis added).
78. See Contract Plating, 631 F. Supp. at 1293.
79. Brewer v. City of Bristol, 577 F. Supp. 519, 527 (E.D. Tenn. 1983); American
Recovery Co., 681 F. Supp. at 613.
80. Chesapeake Bay Found., 769 F.2d at 209.
81. In fact, no environmental law provides a statute of limitations for citizen law-
suits. Note, Statute of Limitations for Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 195, 196 n.14 (1986).
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the generic five-year federal statute of limitations for penalty
actions. 8
2
With the notable exception of the New Jersey District
Courts,8 3 the prevailing view is that the federal five-year limita-
tion applies.8 4 In support of this conclusion, courts cite the
need for uniformity in citizen enforcement suits, both from
state-to-state and between citizen suits and EPA enforcement
actions.8 5 Since proceedings initiated by the EPA would be
governed by the federal five-year limitation, the same standard
should be applied to citizen lawsuits. 86
The perennial questions on application of a statute of limita-
tions, of course, are (1) when does it begin to run; and
(2) when is the time limitation tolled? Noting the injustice in
letting the time limitation begin to run when the violations oc-
cur (since reports of these violations are not available for some
time thereafter), the courts have concluded that the statute be-
gins to run when the reports documenting the violations are
filed with the EPA.87 The courts have held that the statute of
limitations is tolled upon filing of plaintiff's notice letter.88
The court in Sierra Club v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.8 9 realized that
tolling the statute upon filing of notice allows plaintiff to delay
filing the complaint until perhaps years after notice yet still be
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982). The statute provides: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any
civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained un-
less commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued .. "
83. See, e.g., SPIRG v. P.D. Oil & Chem. Storage, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1074 (D.N.J.
1986) (holding that no statute of limitations applies); Public Interest Research Group
v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 681 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that
no statute of limitations applies); see also F. Thomas, Citizen Suits and the NPDES Pro-
gram: A Review of Clean Water Act Decisions, 17 ENVrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10050,
10052 n.32 (1987).
84. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir.
1987); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp.
284, 287 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F.
Supp. 207, 213 (D. Conn. 1985); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
608 F. Supp. 440, 450 (D. Md. 1985); Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enterprises, 618
F. Supp. 532, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
85. See Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440,
447-48 (D.C. Md. 1985).
86. Id. at 448.
87. Al Tech, 635 F. Supp. at 287-88; Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Mid-
land Co., No. 84 Civ. 413 (N.D.N.Y. June 16, 1986).
88. See, e.g., Al Tech, 635 F. Supp. at 288.
89. 834 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987).
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within the statute of limitations. 90 To avoid this loophole, the
court held that the statute of limitations period is tolled sixty
days before the filing of the complaint.9 1
E. Penalties
Prior to February 4, 1987, the CWA provided that violators
of a "National Pollution Discharge Elimination System"
(NPDES) permit were subject to civil penalties not to exceed
$10,000 per day of such violation. 92 Although the CWA did
not set forth standards for courts to use to determine appro-
priate civil penalties, the EPA set out guidelines in a published
penalty policy.
93
As of February 4, 1987, Congress amended the CWA to in-
crease the maximum penalty from $10,000 to $25,000 per day
for each violation. 94 In addition, Congress clarified the so
called "per violation per day" rule. Courts had ruled previ-
ously that the language in the CWA set a maximum penalty of
$10,000 per day no matter how many violations on that day.95
The 1987 amendment prescribes penalties for each day of each
violation. Congress incorporated language into the statute
similar to that found in the EPA Penalty Policy to guide
courts96 in assessing penalties. 97 Courts must now consider
the "seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic
benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such
violations, any good faith efforts to comply with the applicable
requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the viola-
tor, and such other matters as justice may require."
98
Courts tend to assess between ten and twenty percent of the
90. See id. at 1524 n.5.
91. Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1524.
92. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982).
93. USEPA Clean Water Act Penalty Policy for Civil Settlement Negotiations, dated Feb-
ruary 11, 1986.
94. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(d) (West Supp. 1988).
95. United States v. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 735, 737-38 (N.D.
Ohio 1975); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp 1542,
1553-55 (D.C. Va. 1985).
96. The court, not a jury, assesses penalties. See Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct.
1831 (1987). In Tull, the Supreme Court held that alleged violators of the Clean
Water Act are entitled to jury trials to determine liability under the CWA, since civil
penalties and injunctive relief can be assessed against the violator, but that there is
no entitlement to a jury to assess civil penalties. Id. at 1840.




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss2/2
CITIZEN'S ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS
maximum statutory penalty. 99 The CWA sets out that amounts
paid are considered penalties;lOO however, citizen groups tradi-
tionally attempt to negotiate settlements which call for pay-
ment by the alleged violator to various environmental
projects.' 0 ' While citizen plaintiffs are not themselves entitled
to damages under the terms of the CWA,10 2 they can be
awarded litigation costs and reasonable attorney's and expert
fees. 103
A negotiated settlement in a citizen suit customarily takes
the form of a consent order or consent decree.104 The 1987
amendments require that the Department of Justice and the
EPA receive copies of the proposed consent order at least
forty-five days before it is entered by the court.105 Courts must
examine the decree to determine whether it is fair, reasonable
and equitable and does not violate public policy. t0 6
III. THE GWALTNEY DECISION
A. Prelude to Gwaltney
The case of Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. ,107 provides a good example of the way in which
a citizen lawsuit is litigated. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. oper-
ated a meat packing plant on the Pagan River near Smithfield,
Virginia.' 08 In the course of its production, the plant dis-
charged a variety of pollutants into the river.' 0 9 Gwaltney re-
ported its discharge pursuant to a NPDES permit issued under
99. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp.
1542 (E.D. Va. 1985) (20 percent of maximum penalty); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus.,
Inc., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988)(10 percent of maximum penalty).
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1982).
101. Special Report, Environmental Citizen Suits: Confronting the Corporation 17 (BNA
1988). The EPA refers to environmental projects as "credit projects."
102. See Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862, 863 n.l (W.D.N.Y. 1984); City
of Evansville, Indiana v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); see supra note 18 and accompanying text (CAA
citizen suit provision authorizes no damages award to citizen plaintiffs).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
104. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(c)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
105. Id.
106. Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1555, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
107. 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated
and remanded 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987), remanded 844 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1988),judgment
reinstated 688 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Va. 1988).
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the CWA. st0 These reports revealed repeated violations of
Gwaltney's NPDES permits between October 27, 1981 and
May 15, 1984."'1 These violations formed the basis for the citi-
zen lawsuit.
The excessive discharging of pollutants was a chronic prob-
lem for Gwaltney and was particularly severe during the win-
ter."12 Gwaltney had attempted to reduce its discharge in
March 1982, when it installed new equipment for its chlorina-
tion system."13 This action apparently solved the chlorine
emission problem, and helped to control the fecal coliform vi-
olation, but failed to stop Gwaltney's discharge of total
Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), which accounted for most of
Gwaltney's violations."i 4 To combat this problem, Gwaltney
installed a new wastewater treatment system in October of
1983.'15 Despite the addition of this new system, TKN viola-
tions continued throughout the winter of 1983-84. The last
reported violation occurring on May 15, 1984.116
Plaintiffs, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the National
Resource Defense Council, sent their sixty-day notice letter to
Gwaltney, the EPA, and the Virginia State Water Control
Board in February 1984.' '7 They filed suit in June 1984, alleg-
ing that Gwaltney "has violated. . . [and] will continue to vio-
late its NPDES permit.""t 8 Thus, the last reported violation
occurred a few weeks before plaintiff filed suit. They sought
declarative and injunctive relief, civil penalties, and costs, in-
cluding attorney's fees."19 The plaintiffs soon moved, and
were granted, partial summary judgment against defendant on
the issue of liability for the reported violations.' 20
110. Id. at 1544-45. Gwalney exceeded its discharge limitations for several sub-
stances, including fecal coliform, chlorine, total suspended solids (TSS), total
Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), and oil and grease. See 611 F. Supp. at 1544 n.2.
111. Id. at 1544. Prior to October 27, 1981, ITT-Gwaltney owned the plant and was
solely responsible for violations occuring prior to that date. Those violations were
not at issue in the lawsuit. "Only the violations subsequent to Gwaltney's assumption
of responsibility on October 27, 1981," were at issue. Id. at 1545.
112. 688 F. Supp. at 1079.




117. Id. Thus, the violations were continuing at the time of the notice letter.
118. Id. at 380.
119. Id.
120. Id. As discussed earlier, this is a common occurrence in citizen lawsuits.
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In time, Gwaltney's new treatment system became quite ef-
fective. Gwaltney reported no violations of NPDES permits for
the winter of 1984-85. Confident that they had solved the
problem, Gwaltney moved for dismissal of the citizen suit in
May 1985.121 In its memorandum decision, the district court
addressed the issues of subject matter jurisdiction over citizen
suits for wholly past violations and the appropriate penalties to
be assessed in this case. 122 On the first issue, the court con-
cluded it had jurisdiction over a suit for wholly past violations.
The court reasoned that, unless citizens may sue for civil pen-
alties regardless of defendant's compliance at the time the suit
is filed, the deterrent effect of citizen suits would be lost, since
polluters would have no incentive to reduce their discharge
until a citizen suit is actually commenced. In addition, the
court argued, to hold otherwise would plunge the courts into
the search for standards to decide when a violation is "continu-
ing"-no easy task in light of the fact that DMRs are not avail-
able until a month or more after the discharge occurs. 123
On the penalties issue, the court, using the EPA Penalty Pol-
icy' 24 as a guideline, assessed civil penalties against Gwaltney
in the amount of $1,285,322, out of a maximum of $6.6 mil-
lion. 25 The court arrived at the $6.6 million maximum by
making two important interpretations of Section 1319(d). 126
The court interpreted the phrase "$10,000 per day of such vio-
lation"' 127 to mean (1) violating a monthly limitation subjects
the violator to a maximum penalty of $300,000-$10,000 for
each day in the month-regardless of the amount discharged
on any single day, and (2) violation of a daily limitation sub-
jects the violator to a maximum penalty of $10,000, regardless
of how many substances were discharged in excess of the daily
limitation on that day.' 28
The Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the district
121. Id.
122. The court also addressed the question of standing. See 611 F. Supp. at
1545-47.
123. Id. at 1549.
124. The court used the June 1984 penalty policy, the most current one available
at that time. Id. at 1556.
125. The highest penalties ever awarded in a citizen lawsuit up to that time. See
supra note 99 and accompanying text.
126. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982).
127. Id.
128. 611 F. Supp. at 1553-55.
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court's ruling on both issues.' 2 9 Thus, the court embraced a
view of citizen lawsuits as formidable enforcement mecha-
nisms, which authorized private citizens to "step into the shoes
of government agencies that failed to act."' 130 Consistent with
this congressionally-conceived "private attorneys general" role
for citizen suits, argued the court, citizen-plaintiffs should have
enforcement powers co-extensive with those of the EPA,
whose powers undoubtedly include bringing suit for civil pen-
alties for purely past violations.'31 Therefore, the language of
Section 505(a) is properly interpreted to allow citizen suits
based upon violations occurring solely in the past. 132 Upon
their second consecutive defeat, Gwaltney of Smithfield ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court.
B. The Gwaltney Opinion
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,133 is one of
the few statements of the Supreme Court on environmental
citizen lawsuits. 3 4 In light of its narrow holding and ambigu-
ous language, as discussed below, it is almost certainly not the
final word from the Supreme Court on this subject.
The issue before the Court in Gwaltney concerned the timing
of the alleged violations for which the citizen-plaintiff sought
relief. It is undisputed that a citizen-plaintiff may seek relief, in
the form of injunction and civil penalties, for violations occur-
ring on or after the date the lawsuit is commenced. Before
Gwaltney, it appears to have been undisputed that, where viola-
tions continue on or after the date the lawsuit was commenced,
129. 791 F.2d at 315-17.
130. Id. at 311 (quoting SPIRG v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190,
1199 (D.NJ. 1985) aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, SPIRG v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 842
F.2d. 1436 (3d Cir. 1988)).
131. 791 F.2d at 309 (citing United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368,
375-76 (10th Cir. 1979)) (EPA may seek civil penalties for past violations); United
States v. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 735, 738 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (EPA
may seek civil penalties for past violations); AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. at
1197 (EPA may bring suit based on past violations); SPIRG v. Monsanto Co., 600 F.
Supp. 1474, 1476 (D.N.J. 1985) ("It can hardly be argued that the Government is
restricted to abatement actions").
132. 791 F.2d at 311.
133. 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
134. See also Middlesex City Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1 (1981) (holding that the CWA and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries of
1972 contain no implied right of action for private citizen); City of Milwaukee v. Illi-
nois, 451 U.S. 304 (1980).
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citizen-plaintiffs could seek civil penalties for violations occur-
ring before the suit was commenced. 3 5 The issue in Gwaltney
was whether plaintiffs could go one step further. In other
words, whether section 505 of the CWA "confers jurisdiction
over citizen suits for wholly past violations."' 136 This issue
turns on the language of section 505 which states, "any citi-
zen" may commence an action against "any person ... who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
. . . or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State... ."137 The Supreme Court was prompted to consider
this issue by a three-way split between the Fifth, First, and
Fourth Circuits. 13
8
The first federal appellate court to rule on this issue was the
Fifth Circuit, which held in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical
Company' 3 9 that section 505 confers subject matter jurisdiction
only over citizen suits in which the plaintiffs allege a current,
ongoing violation of an effluent standard, limitation, or or-
der. 140 The Hamker court was convinced that the "ordinary
meaning"' 14 1 of the key language unambiguously indicates that
suits for wholly past violations are not authorized. 142 The
court found further support for this view in the supplemental
role that citizen suits are intended to play, the notice provision
of section 505,143 and congressional intent to avoid overbur-
dening the courts with citizen suits. 144
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the
holding of Hamker in Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney. 145
The Fourth Circuit found the language "to be in violation,"
ambiguous, and considering the statutory scheme and legisla-
tive history, held that the statute permitted "citizen suits for
violations occurring solely in the past."' 46
After the Fourth Circuit's ruling, the First Circuit took up
135. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
136. 108 S. Ct. at 378.
137. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
138. 108 S. Ct at 380-81.
139. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).




144. Id. at 396.
145. 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986).
146. Id. at 312.
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the issue in Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 147 The
Pawtuxet Cove court held that section 505 confers jurisdiction
over a citizen suit where the plaintiff "fairly alleges a continu-
ing likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined, will again
proceed to violate the Act."'' 48 Thus, according to the First
Circuit, suits for purely past violations are not authorized.
However, jurisdiction is not so narrow that a case must be dis-
missed simply because no violation occurred on the date the
complaint was filed.149 With this third distinct interpretation
of identical statutory language, the stage was set for a Supreme
Court ruling. 1
50
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court, interpreting the same
statute on the same issue, came to a conclusion different from
all the circuit courts, although the court's interpretation most
closely resembles that of the First Circuit. Writing for the
court,' 5' Justice Marshall concluded that section 505 does not
confer jurisdiction over citizen lawsuits for wholly past viola-
tions.' 52 Rather, to invoke the district court's jurisdiction, the
plaintiff must make a good-faith allegation that there exists a
"continuous or intermittent violation - that is, a reasonable
likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the
future."15
3
Analyzing the statutory language, the Court acknowledged
that the provision is, indeed, ambiguous, although the "most
natural" reading of the words is a requirement that plaintiffs
allege continuous or intermittent violations.154 The Court bol-
stered this interpretation by noting the pervasive use of the
present tense throughout section 505 of the CWA, as well as in
147. 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986).
148. Id. at 1094.
149. One court, following Hamker, dismissed an action for this very reason. See
Sierra Club v. Copolymer Rubber & Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (N.D. La.
1985).
150. For an interesting discussion of this split among the circuits, see Note, Citizen
Suits and Civil Penalties Under the Clean Water Act, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1656 (1987); see also,
Comment, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act: Waiting for the Godot in the Fifth Circuit,
62 TUL. L. REV. 175 (1987).
151. The Court was unanimous in parts one and two of the opinion, however,
three justices concurred but refused to join part three of the opinion. Thosejustices
where Stevens, O'Connor, and Scallia.
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other environmental citizen statutes. 155 This fact, coupled with
the statutory definition of "citizen,"' 56 led the Court to con-
clude that "the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit
lies in the present or the future, not in the past."'
157
The Court found further support for its interpretation in the
sixty-day notice provision of section' 505.158 The logical pur-
pose of giving notice to the alleged violator is to give it a
chance to bring itself into compliance, thereby rendering the
citizen suit unnecessary. 159 If citizens may sue for wholly past
violations, argued the Court, this requirement of notice is
superfluous. 16 0
Further, the Court argued, permitting citizen suits for wholly
past violations could hinder governmental enforcement of the
CWA and curtail the Administrator's discretion in prosecuting
violators.' 6 ' Declaring that citizen lawsuits are meant to "sup-
plement rather than to supplant"'162 governmental action, the
court refused to "change the nature of citizens' role from in-
terstitial to potentially intrusive."' 163 Finally, the Court found
support for its interpretation in the Act's legislative history.164
After answering the narrow issue of the case, the Court went
on to elaborate upon its "good-faith allegation" standard of
jurisdiction. Three of the justices refused to join in this elabo-
ration.165 The court began this part of the opinion by asserting
that citizen-plaintiffs need not prove their allegations of ongo-
ing violations before jurisdiction attaches under section 505.166
Rather, all that is required for jurisdiction is a good-faith alle-
gation of ongoing noncompliance with the Act.' 67 To hold
otherwise, said the Court, would be to read the word "alleged"
out of section 505, ignoring "Congress' sensitivity to the prac-
155. Id. at 381-82.
156. Id. at 382.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 382-83.
159. Id.




164. Id. at 383-84.
165. See supra note 151.
166. 108 S. Ct at 385.
167. Protection against frivolous allegations is provided by Rule i of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The court stated that Rule 11 "requires pleadings to be
based on a good faith belief, formed after reasonable inquiry." Id.
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tical difficulties of detecting and proving chronic episodic vio-
lations of environmental standards."168
Addressing petitioner Gwaltney's contention that this could
allow plaintiffs to maintain suit even though, in fact, they lack
constitutional standing,169 the Court replied that allegations of
injury are sufficient to meet the standing requirement. 70 It is
well settled that "a suit will not be dismissed for lack of stand-
ing if there are sufficient 'allegations of fact'-not proof-in
the complaint or supporting affidavits.' 17 1 The defendant, the
court noted, has the opportunity to challenge the allegations
upon motion for summary judgment and at trial on the
merits. 172
Finally, the Court addressed the fears of petitioner that,
under the Court's ruling, a citizen suit could continue to con-
clusion, even where the defendant has come into compliance
with the Act after the suit was commenced. The Court sug-
gested that the mootness doctrine would prevent continuance
of a lawsuit when no wrong remains to be remedied. Empha-
sizing that the defendant's burden "is a heavy one,"' 173 the
Court stated that in order to prevail on mootness grounds the
defendant must show it is "absolutely clear" that the wrongful
behavior could not be reasonably expected to recur. 174
C. Lower Courts' Responses
Whatever the impact of Gwaltney on all other citizen lawsuits,
its impact on the case itself is now clear. On remand, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that plaintiffs
had made their allegation of an ongoing violation in good
faith. 175 The Fourth Circuit did not end its inquiry there, how-
ever. It went on to hold that plaintiffs must prove at trial the
existence of an ongoing violation in order to gain any relief.
The court stated:
Citizen-plaintiffs may accomplish this either (1) by proving





172. Id. at 385-86.
173. Id. at 386.
174. Id.
175. 844 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1988).
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filed, or (2) by adducing evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a recur-
rence in intermittent or sporadic violations. Intermittent or
sporadic violations do not cease to be ongoing until the
date when there is no real likelihood of repetition.'
76
The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
factual determinations on this question.
77
On remand, the district court held that, in light of the stan-
dards enunciated by the Fourth Circuit, plaintiffs had demon-
strated at trial that some "reasonable likelihood of a
recurrence in intermittent violations existed."' 78 Refusing to
consider Gwaltney's argument that only civil penalties relating
to those violations likely to continue are assessable, the district
court reinstated its earlier judgment that Gwaltney be assessed
civil penalties in the sum of $1,285,322.1
79
With respect to the instant case, then, Gwaltney's persistent
and, no doubt, expensive defense was to no avail. The jury is
still out, however, on Gwaltney's success in stemming the re-
cent flood of citizen environmental lawsuits.
The confusing and ambiguous nature of the Gwaltney opin-
ion is reflected by the reaction of industry and environmental-
ists to the decision. Both groups proclaimed victory upon
announcement of the decision. Indeed, the New York Times re-
ported that lawyers on each side of the Gwaltney lawsuit pro-
claimed a ninety-percent victory after the decision was
rendered. 8 0 Depending upon how lower courts interpret
Gwaltney, either side could be right.
D. Gwaltney Aftermath
Gwaltney is a positive step for citizen environmental lawsuits
on two levels. First, jurisdiction attaches if the citizen makes a
good faith allegation of continuous or intermittent viola-
tions.' 8' Even though citizen suits for purely past violations
are prohibited, the jurisdictional standard articulated by the
Court presents no insurmountable or hypertechnical burdens
to invoking jurisdiction. As such, the Court recognized the
176. Id. at 171-72.
177. Id. at 172.
178. 688 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1988).
179. Id. at 1080.
180. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1987, at 24, col. 1.
181. 108 S. Ct. at 387.
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value and importance of citizen suits to the scheme of environ-
mental enforcement in this country.
The second positive step for citizen suits resulting from
Gwaltney is the severe limitations placed on a company attempt-
ing to demonstrate its compliance with its NPDES permit. The
Court made clear that there was a heavy burden carried by the
company to demonstrate that its wrongful behavior will not
continue.'8 2 Before dismissal of the suit, defendant must make
"absolutely clear" that no further violations will occur.18 3
However, the Court's somewhat unnecessary discussion of
mootness presents potential problems to citizen plaintiffs. The
Court's suggestion that a company who comes into compliance
after commencement of the suit could successfully move for
dismissal leads to a troubling and unaddressed issue: what
happens to the citizen's claim for penalties? Justice Marshall,
in language encouraging to industrial violators, suggests that a
defendant is not exposed to penalties; rather, its only concern
is payment of plaintiff's litigation costs.' 8 4 Perhaps the injunc-
tive aspect of a citizen lawsuit is resolved, but the penalties as-
pect is not.
The Court confuses the issue of commencing an action based
on wholly past violations of the Clean Water Act and maintain-
ing the penalty aspect of a properly-commenced lawsuit, even if a
company has convinced the court it has rectified the problem.
The first action is prohibited; the second should not be be-
cause the citizens are entitled to resolution of the penalty
issue.
It is possible that the barriers to a mootness dismissal articu-
lated by Justice Marshal 18 5 will practically avoid the problems.
182. Id. at 386.
183. Id.
184. Justice Marshall states:
Under the Act, plaintiffs are also protected from the suddenly repentant de-
fendant by the authority of the District Courts to award litigation costs
"whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(d). The legislative history of this provision states explicitly that the
award of costs "should extend to plaintiffs in actions which result in success-
ful abatement but do not reach a verdict. For instance, if as a result of a
citizen proceeding and before a verdict is issued, a defendant abated a viola-
tion, the court may award litigation expenses borne by the plaintiffs in pros-
ecuting such actions." S. Rep. No. 02-414, at 81, 2 Leg. Hist. 1499.
Id. at 386 n.6.
185. Id. He refers to dismissal attempts somewhat caustically as "predictable
'protestations of repentance and reform' " (citing United States v. Oregon State
Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)).
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However, the issue is left unaddressed by the opinion.
A related problem left open in Gwaltney is a citizen's entitle-
ment to litigate penalties at all for past violations. The
Gwaltney opinion is literally peppered with comments that the
CWA citizen provisions are forward-looking and not concerned
with remedying past violations.' 86 Given this language, plus
the statement that citizens may seek civil penalties only in a suit
brought to abate an ongoing violation, 8 7 defendants could ar-
gue that civil penalties for violations occurring before the suit
is commenced are not authorized by Section 505.18
Environmentalists will argue that the court has determined
to assess civil penalties for all violations (pre-complaint and
post-complaint) so long as plaintiff makes a good faith allega-
tion of continuing violations. Two courts, without squarely ad-
dressing the issue, assessed penalties for pre-complaint
violations after the Gwaltney decision.' 89 One court has directly
ruled that pre-complaint violations can be assessed penalties in
a citizen lawsuit.' 90
CONCLUSION
The reaction of federal courts post-Gwaltney does nothing to
strike fear in the hearts of citizen environmentalists. Both the
Fourth Circuit and the Gwaltney district court ruled in favor of
the environmentalists.
Citizen lawsuits under the CWA are and will continue to be a
significant element of environmental enforcement. Although
Gwaltney leaves some issues unclear, particularly with regard to
186. 108 S. Ct. at 381-85.
187. Id. at 382.
188. This position has been adopted by at least one federal district court. Student
Public Interest Group of New Jersey, Inc., v. Monsanto Co., No. 83 Civ. 2040
(D.C.N.J. Mar. 30, 1988). In this case the court, relying on the "forward looking"
language of Gwaltney, determined that in citizen lawsuits penalties should only be
assessed for post-complaint violations. The United States moved to participate as an
amicus curiae to support its position that civil penalties may be imposed for pre-com-
plaint violations in a properly filed citizen lawsuit. The district court denied the
United States' motion to participate. The district court in Monsanto later amended its
order to allow the imposition of penalties for the interim period before the filing of
the sixty-day notice letter and the filing of the complaint. (Order dated May 9, 1988).
189. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 1078,
1080 (E.D. Va. 1988); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1522 (9th
Cir. 1987).
190. Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., No. 87
Civ. 1884 (D.NJ. April 20, 1988).
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past penalties, it clarifies jurisdictional issues and presents no
hypertechnical barriers to citizen lawsuits. As such, citizen law-
suits will continue to assist in restoring and maintaining "the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters. "191
191. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
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